Mandatory Use of Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Encryption for the AN/PSN-13 Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR)

1.  Situation. This MARADMIN provides guidance
on the continued use of encrypted Position, Navigation, and
Timing (PNT) for the AN/PSN-13 Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR).
MARADMIN 566/18 (ref D) has expired. This message reinforces and
updates policy to ensure the continued security of the DAGR
and other devices with embedded SAASM as we transition to Military
GPS User Equipment (MGUE). Other devices include tactical radios
(AN/PRC-117G and AN/PRC-163), Tactical Handoff Systems (THS),
or Common Laser Range Finder Integrated Capability (CLRF IC).
1.a. Importance of encrypted PNT. Per refs A and B, GPS is the DOD's
primary source of PNT. To counter adversary capabilities, DOD policy
mandates the use of the Protected Positioning Service (PPS).
PPS-SAASM is an encrypted GPS service providing enhanced accuracy
and anti-spoofing/anti-jamming (AS/AJ) capabilities not available in
the civilian Standard Positioning Service (SPS). The use of
PPS-SAASM is critical to enabling resilience against adversary
attacks and enabling joint force operations. Failure to adhere to
PPS-SAASM will result in inaccurate PNT, severely affecting mission
accomplishment, the accuracy of fires, and the overall safety
of personnel. 
2.  Mission. Effective immediately, all commands will mandate the
exclusive use of SAASM encryption for all training, exercise, and
operational employment of the DAGR and other SAASM enabled devices
to ensure accurate and reliable GPS capability.  
3.  Execution. This policy applies to all Marine Corps units that
possess, operate, or maintain the SAASM based user equipment
(SAASM UE).
3.a. Tasks:
3.b. For any employment of the SAASM UE, the device must be properly
loaded with current cryptographic keys and operated in a
SAASM-encrypted mode.
3.c. Local Communications Security (COMSEC) account managers will
maintain appropriate SAASM keys if they maintain SAASM UE in their
command or subordinate commands.  At time of publish the current
keys include BKAUPD, BGUV, and BCVM.
3.d. Major Subordinate Command (MSC) COMSEC account managers will
ensure proper issuance of keys to subordinate units to support all
training and real-world operations.
3.e. Six digit COMSEC account owners will ensure that SAASM
encryption is available for all devices with current SAASM
modification instructions published by Marine Corps Systems
Command (MCSC).
3.f. Local S6 elements and fires control elements will ensure SAASM
encryption is used on devices which accept SAASM.
3.g. Annual Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) inspections will
verify that keying material is available for SAASM.
3.h. Commanding General Readiness Inspection (CGRI) teams will
inspect SAASM key issuance logs.
3.i. MEF and MSC G6s sections will distribute to all subordinate 
elements Modification Instructions as they are published by MCSC.
4.  Administration and Logistics. The instructions for loading
cryptographic keys and upgrading DAGR software are contained in
the references and available through standard Marine Corps
technical publication channels.
4.a. Units must plan for the re-keying of DAGRs following any
software upgrades, as crypto keys are erased during the
reprogramming process (ref E).
5. Command and Signal.
5.a. Command. This MARADMIN is applicable to the total force.
5.b. Signal. Questions regarding this guidance should be directed
to the POCs listed above.
6.  Release authorized by Lieutenant General J. A. Matos III,
Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Information.